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This paper briefly describes the most relevant current approaches to the implementation of scientific models of consciousness. Main
aspects of scientific theories of consciousness are characterized in sight of their possible mapping into artificial implementations. These
implementations are analyzed both theoretically and functionally. Also, a novel pragmatic functional approach to machine conscious-
ness is proposed and discussed. A set of axioms for the presence of consciousness in agents is applied to evaluate and compare the various
models.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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There exist theories of consciousness mainly based in
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coThroughout centuries philosophers and scientists have
developed many theories trying to account for human con-
sciousness. Despite this great historic effort in the search
for an explanation for natural consciousness, relatively lit-
tle effort has been made in the corresponding field of Arti-
ficial Intelligence. The scientific advances achieved during
the last three decades in the quest for an explanation of
consciousness have had a modest influence in bio-inspired
artificial systems. However, this matter has attracted grow-
ing interest recently, e.g. Holland (2003).
Consciousness can be defined as the relation between
attention, reasoning, recognition and behavior, i.e., a con-
scious being has the capability to pay attention toward
something, think about it, wonder what is it, how it is,
why is the way it is, etc., with the aim to recognize it. Once
the object (or event) is identified, the subject decides what
to do with it. The machine consciousness paradigm is
inspired by these conscious/unconscious processes
observed in the mind of humans and other higher mam-
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masm@inf.uc3m.es (A. Sanchis de Miguel).ilding artificial systems with the same advantageous abil-
es and functionalities as those that consciousness has
dowed on humans thanks to evolution.
The complex nature of some of the theories of con-
iousness is the root problem in the process of modeling
em computationally. Some of the paradigms applied to
count for conscious processes, like quantum mechanics
ameroff and Penrose, 1996) or electromagnetic compo-
nts of brain waves (Rakovic, 1990) are practically impos-
ble to reproduce applying classical software techniques.
urrent implementations discussed here are based on cog-
tive theories, in which the problem of consciousness is
dressed from a functional system-level perspective.
Limiting the scopenctional cognitive aspects, like the approaches proposed
Baars (1993) and Dennett (1991), which might be imple-
ented pragmatically using Artificial Intelligence tech-
ques. Nevertheless, given the complexity of the matter,
initial differentiation between the main dimensions of
nscious processes has to be defined. Thus, we can clearly
tablish the aspects of consciousness that we aim to imi-
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ness cover several perspectives or dimensions of conscious-
ness, which are often merged in a confusing fashion. Block
(1995) makes a useful distinction between Phenomenal
Consciousness (P-Consciousness), Access Consciousness
(A-Consciousness), Monitoring Consciousness (M-Con-
sciousness), and Self-Consciousness (S-Consciousness).
This quartet comprises all the current scientific perspectives
of consciousness. Quite briefly described, P-Consciousness
refers to subjective experience or qualia Dennett (1991).
A-Consciousness defines the accessibility of contents for
reasoning, volition and speech. M-Consciousness is about
inner perception or introspection. Finally, the ability of
self-recognising and reasoning about the recognized self is
called S-Consciousness. In the context of this work we have
primarily built on a combination of A-Consciousness,
M-Consciousness and S-Consciousness, which we call Rea-
soning Consciousness. According to Block (1995), in some
cases it is feasible to have access consciousness without
phenomenal consciousness. However, other authors argue
that A-Consciousness correlates with P-Consciousness
(Chalmers, 1990).
P-Consciousness is the subjective experience that the indi-
vidual has due to the fact that he/she is conscious, whereas
reasoning consciousness is the availability for the use of rea-
soning, actions and speech. The vast unconscious domain of
knowledge and concurrent control routines can be accessed
using consciousness as a gateway. The reasoning conscious-
ness dimension is very interesting regarding its possible
application in artificial systems. Phenomenal aspects are
considered out of the scope of the present analysis.3. From theories of consciousness to artificial
implementationsIn the context of the present analysis, we aim to under-
stand how the access to knowledge and perception is man-
aged and how the control of a vast set of complex parallel
(unconscious) processes is carried out from a unique
sequential (conscious) thread. At any given time there are
a great number of neuronal unconscious processes running
in parallel in a human brain; however, only certain con-
tents are showed to the consciousness at a particular time,
i.e. attention determines the contents of mind that are per-
ceived consciously. Therefore, one of the main features of
conscious processes, in contrast with unconscious pro-
cesses, is that the former are very much limited. In humans
conscious mechanisms are based on short term memory
and the selection of attention focus. These aspects are
clearly limited, two different voluntary actions cannot be
done at the same time consciously and working memory
cannot manage more than approximately seven elements
at the same time, e.g. telephone numbers (Miller, 1956).
Several hypotheses have been developed trying to
account for the mechanisms, evolution, function, and fea-
tures of consciousness (Atkinson et al., 2000). Here wefocus on those accounts advocating for processes rather
than vehicles, i.e. those which explain consciousness as
functional or relational properties of representational vehi-
cles. These kinds of theories, where consciousness is pro-
duced by the computations independently of any
particular intrinsic properties of the vehicles, are suscepti-
ble to being applied in artificial machinery. In order to
characterize consciousness, assumptions are usually made
on the following aspects: conscious versus unconscious
knowledge processing and learning, coherence or coalition
mechanisms, goals, and emotions. The way these assump-
tions are mapped into the machine consciousness domain
as functional modules is discussed below.
Depending on the conscious or unconscious nature of
the processes, knowledge can be declarative or procedural,
localized or distributed, serial or parallel. Knowledge rep-
resentation is implicit in unconscious processes and explicit
in conscious processes. Implicit information is not directly
accessible unless interpretative mechanisms are used. Sun
(2002) argues that the cognitive processes are structured
in these two levels with different mechanisms. Therefore,
the results coming from the two levels must be integrated
somehow. According to Sun a synergy is obtained between
the implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) process-
ing. In (Schacter et al., 1995) evidence of dissociation of
different types of knowledge in the brain is analyzed.
Common factors in many theories are concepts like
coherence or coalition. These ideas aim to account for
the integrative function of consciousness and its emergence
from functionally heterogeneous neural networks or sepa-
rate unconscious processors. As described by Baars
(1993) a number of specialized unconscious processors pro-
vide information to a global workspace, which coordinates
the processors selecting coherent information patterns.
Another to some extent analogous view is the 40 Hz syn-
chronized activation of neuron coalitions that Crick and
Koch (1991) argued to be the physical base of conscious-
ness in their search for the neural correlates of conscious-
ness. Nevertheless, they refuted this hypothesis after they
checked these activations between 35 and 75 Hz in the cere-
bral cortex and found they were not necessarily related to
conscious processes. Also, Damasio et al. (1990) talk about
coherence in a similar sense. The reverberation in neuronal
areas of sensory convergence integrates information com-
ing from each sense.
Another key aspect of consciousness, very much related
with subject goals, is the emotional dimension. According
to different psychological theories (Marina, 2002), emo-
tions are the mechanism that humans use to synthesize
their situation in the world within the limited scope of their
consciousness. As pointed out by Franklin et al. (1998), in
a machine consciousness system, feelings or emotions pro-
vide an assessment about how the system goals are being
accomplished. In humans, emotions influence behavior
according to belief systems and personality (Martinez-Mir-
anda and Aldea, 2005). Therefore, under a frustration state
some individuals give up their original objectives com-
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tives. The significant role that emotions can play is often
neglected in machine consciousness models.ch
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M4. From metaphors of consciousness to functional design
Metaphors can help us to intuitively understand how
consciousness works. Additionally, an analysis of the func-
tions of consciousness can be derived from the study of
these metaphors. Two of the most relevant metaphors are
briefly introduced in this section. In the Global Workspace
Theory Baars (1997) describes a ‘‘theatre’’ in which the
spotlight represents the focus of consciousness directed by
attention. The complete scene corresponds to the working
memory, which is the memory system in charge of conscious
contents of mind. The information obtained in the spotlight
is distributed globally throughout the theater to two types
of unconscious processors: the ones forming the audience
receive information from the spotlight; whereas, behind
scenes, the unconscious contextual systems form the events
taking place in the spotlight. The actors compete for
appearing in the attention spotlight, in which they appear
as completely conscious contents. The spotlight attention
selection is done to a great extent behind the scenes. The
unconscious processors carry out this selection based on
context and sets of beliefs (usually unconscious) that deter-
mine the conscious thoughts (the play in scene). Baars also
indicates that the spotlight of consciousness is the instru-
ment used by the ‘‘director’’ for decision making in the field
of working memory guided by goal achievement. Conscious
experiences activate unconscious contexts, which help in
interpreting future conscious events. In sum, consciousness
provides a framework for access to the vast unconscious
contents of mind. It seems that the research work done
using brain imaging techniques (fMRI, PET, etc.) indicate
that this hypothesis could be true (Baars, 2002); however,
more neurological analyses are needed to definitely confirm
or refute Baars’ assumptions.
Another illustrative metaphor is known as the Multiple
Draft Model (Dennett, 1991). Dennett proposes an edito-
rial review process metaphor, where coalitions of uncon-
scious processors evolve due to reiterative edition and
review until they are presented as the official published con-
tent of the mind. Given the highly parallel nature of brain
processing, sensory stimuli are processed concurrently.
Moreover, the information is continuously being reviewed
and ‘‘edited’’, i.e. modified in order to adapt it to the new
information that is being acquired. The subject is not aware
of any of these continuous changes. By contrast, a sequen-
tial – already interpreted – version is finally available to
subjective experience. Most of the draft versions that com-
peted for consciousness are deleted and only one version,
one narrative flow is fixed in memory. Furthermore, con-
tents in memory are also under constant revision.
We have tried to extract a number of reasoning con-
sciousness functional components from the theories of con-iousness we have analyzed. We aim to separate the
nctional dimension from the phenomenal aspects of con-
iousness, and identify from the former the functions and
aracteristics that make consciousness an evolutionary
dvantage for the conscious beings. Baars (1997) identifies
ine functions of consciousness according to his theory.
he functions identified by Baars are about adaptation,
arning, contextualization, access to a self system, prioriti-
tion, recruitment of unconscious processors, decision
aking, error-detection, self-monitoring and optimization.
aking into account these functions, jointly with Dennett’s
pproach, and including a more elaborated affective
imension to the picture, we have defined a set of basic
nctional components intended to accomplish all the rea-
ning consciousness functionality: (1) attention, (2) status
ssessment, (3) global search, (4) preconscious manage-
ent, (5) contextualization, (6) sensory prediction, (7)
odal and multimodal memory management and (8) self-
ordination.
Our hypothesis is that these functional components
ould be integrated in a machine consciousness system
order to have the expected advantages. This component
st is specifically related to consciousness. Other cognitive
nctions required in an intelligent system have not been
cluded in the list. The identified functional components
f consciousness are integrated in CERA (Conscious and
motional Reasoning Architecture), which is a model
esigned for autonomous robot control (Arrabales and
anchis, 2006). The functional modules are briefly
escribed as follows: (1) The attention mechanism provides
e individual with the capability to pay attention to a
etermined event or object, and drive its learning and
ehavior. (2) The status assessment component comprises
e ability of the subject to keep a conscious summary of
s state. Emotions play this role. (3) Global search implies
ccess to virtually all the knowledge the individual has.
his ability is necessary for the access to unconscious con-
ol routines and different memory systems. (4) The separa-
on between conscious and unconscious processes has to
e based on the differentiation between explicit and implicit
nowledge, respectively. In each of these domains a learn-
g capability has to be present, i.e., unconscious implicit
arning and conscious explicit learning. Both domains
ust be coordinated via control and access mechanisms
ch as attention and global search. (5) Contextualization
needed for the recruitment of adequate unconscious pro-
ssors by the conscious control system. The retrieval of
roblem related knowledge is required as part of problem
lving processes. Associative memory retrieval mechanism
an example of contextualization. (6) Sensory prediction
nction provides a continuous unconscious monitoring
nd prediction process of the information obtained by
e senses. When the perceived differs from the expected,
e corresponding information has to become conscious.
hat means that the individual pays attention to the unex-
ected situation in order to deal successfully with it. (7)
ultimodal memory (which corresponds to semantic
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tents from all senses converge temporarily. Consciousness
is multimodal. In contrast, modal memories indefinitely
keep specific kinds of content (for instance, visual mem-
ory). The CERA memory management module is in charge
of integrating and providing access to all memory systems.
(8) Self-coordination component is in charge of next action
selection and it is driven by the accomplishment of the
established goals. Mechanisms such as inner talk and intro-
spection could be included in this component as project
management tools (where a project is the set of tasks to
be done in order to accomplish one or more goals).
There exist several relationships and synergies between
the components described above, which we think should
also be implemented in any machine consciousness system
(see Fig. 1). Novelties require more participation of con-
sciousness for their learning (Grossberg, 2003), i.e. interre-
lation between modules 1 and 6. Components 5 and 6
represent the top–down and bottom–up control flows,
respectively. On one hand, conscious will invoke uncon-
scious processing in order to achieve its goals; On the other
hand, unconscious processors that integrate information
coming from the senses call the conscious attention in case
of an unexpected or novel situation. This is the way
machine consciousness provides the means to integrate
top–down and bottom-up recognition flows. We believe
that coherence and coalition properties of processes men-
tioned above are covered in component 5 because the asso-
ciation of processors constitutes a kind of coherence at a
functional level. Component 7 represents the personal his-
tory of the individual. This concept provides the self with
the necessary unity to manage its own experience and iden-
tity. The mechanism of coordination indicated in compo-
nent 8 is related to the status assessment module 2
(emotions), because goal and action selection are condi-
tioned by the emotional state.Fig. 1. In the left diagram solid lines represent CERA Core modules. Dashed
lines represent CERA physical layer. Right diagrams illustrates CERA layere5. Models of consciousness implementations
There exist several artificial systems partially bio-
inspired in the mechanisms of consciousness and attention.
Most of them are based on the Global Workspace Theory
(Baars, 1993, 1997). The most salient examples are IDA
(Intelligent Distribution Agent) (Franklin et al., 1998),
LIDA (Learning IDA) (Ramamurthy et al., 2006) and
Computational Agent Framework for Consciousness
(Moura and Bonzon, 2004). IDA is designed specifically
for the optimization of task assignment for US Navy staff,
and LIDA is its learning extension, which is intented to be
applied to real complex problems that need to be
approached in a human-like way. Moura and Bonzon’s
proposal is potentially a general purpose system. They con-
sider the concepts of plan and condition, and the model is
based on deliberation and concurrent context formation.
The obvious progression of machine consciousness
implementations is the cognitive design of control systems
for autonomous robots, i.e. cognitive robotics. We think
that experimentation with physical autonomous agents is
key to evaluating and comparing these kinds of machine
consciousness architectures. In this domain, a number of
recent works are of interest: LIDA-AV (the application
of LIDA to an Autonomous Vehicle), Brain-Inspired
Architecture for Cognitive Robotics (Shanaham, 2005),
and the aforementioned CERA architecture. However,
with the current state of the art in this domain, where
architectures for consciousness are not yet fully mature, a
direct empirical evaluation based on real world problems
is unfeasible. What can be done at this stage is a qualitative
analysis to evaluate these concept-models from a func-
tional design standpoint. We propose testing them against
to a set of axioms for minimal consciousness in agents
(Aleksander and Dunmall, 2003). The minimal axiomatic
base is composed of the following axioms: I. Depictionlines represent CERA instantiation layer (domain-specific modules). Dotted
d design and next action selection contributions.
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scious of imagined as well as perceived events). III. Atten-
tion (agent is capable of selecting parts of its perception or
imagination), IV. Planning (agent has control over imagi-
national states in order to plan actions), and V. Emotion
(agent has affective states to evaluate actions). As discussed
in Arrabales et al. (2007), we believe the CERA model can
fulfill all these minimal axioms. Moura and Bonzon’s pro-
posal does not fully meet axioms II and IV. Additionally,
axiom V is not considered yet. Generally, all the
approaches based on the Global Workspace Theory cover
axioms I, III and V, as they directly correlate to Baars’
account. Imagination and planning over imaginational
states are usually lacking in these models. For instance,
the LIDA cognitive cycle does not include an explicit imag-
inational stage at any step between perception and action,
i.e. action selection is influenced by feelings and emotions,
but goal contexts are only activated as per present percep-
tion. No possible (imagined) future is taken into account
for goal context formation and emotional evaluation.6. Conclusions
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RConsciousness can be the way the nervous system has
evolved to deal with novel and unexpected events in the
world. This idea surpasses old situational systems, in which
an autonomous agent has no need of inner states or knowl-
edge. A common denominator of all the analyzed models is
that consciousness is supposed to emerge from functional
interaction between specialized modules, rather than hav-
ing a specialized consciousness module. Consciousness is
considered a global event produced in distributed parts of
the (artificial) brain. The great challenge in the field of
machine consciousness is the design of such a brain. Two
main approaches exists: imitating the human nervous sys-
tem at the neurophysiological level, e.g. CyberChild (Cotte-
rill, 2003) and applying a system level brain modeling, i.e.
modeling brain functional areas and their interaction.
The latter approach, which corresponds to most of the
implementations discussed above, lies between physiologi-
cal and psychological levels. Which one is the right
approach? We think both have important flaws. On the
one hand, we do not have an accurate knowledge about
all neurophysiological mechanisms. On the other hand,
the implementations presented in this paper are primarily
based on metaphors that simply help us understand in a
holistic way how the human mind works. Actually, a sim-
ple metaphor is far away from an established body of sci-
entific knowledge. However, it can be useful as a tool for
orienting the research in particular directions, which will
confirm or discard the original hypotheses.
Even though the presented functional analysis is just a
simple approximation, it provides heuristic clues about
what functions of consciousness are key for the improve-
ment of learning and adaptive capabilities of a situated
agent. Ideally, an evaluation of an artificial system shoulde done adding and removing functional components.
e propose this as a future project: CERA can be used
s a modular test-bed system suitable to evaluate the
pact of each consciousness function (and the corre-
onding relationships between functions). Such a system
as to be applied to real world problems, where autono-
ous robots interact, collaborating and competing in an
olving ecosystem.eferences
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